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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
WARRANT REQUIRED FOR WIRETAPPING
OF DOMESTIC SUBVERSIVES
On December 7, 1969, the United States charged and indicted three
defendants with conspiracy to destroy government property in violation
of 18 U.S.C. 371. One of the defendants, Lawrence Robert Plamondon
(an alleged White Panther), was charged with the dynamite bombing of an
office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1361.1
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to compel the United
States to disclose certain electronic surveillance information (obtained
without prior judicial approval) and to conduct a hearing to determine
whether this information "tainted" the evidence on which the indictment
was based or which the government intended to offer at trial. In response,
the government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General, acknowledging
that its agents had overheard conversations in which Plamondon had par-
ticipated. 2 The affidavit, together with the logs of the surveillance, were
filed in a sealed exhibit for in camera inspection by the District Court and
on their basis the court rejected the argument that there was no need for a
warrant because this was a reasonable exercise of the President's power
(exercised through the Attorney General) to protect the national security.3
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1361 pertains to the damage or destruction of United States
property valued over $100. 18 U.S.C. § 371 pertains to the conspiracy to destroy
said property.
2. The affidavit stated in part that the Attorney General approved the wiretaps
"to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from
attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of
the Government." (Emphasis added.) The full text of the Attorney General's affi-
davit is printed in the court of appeals decision, United States v. United States Dis-
trict Court, E.D. of Mich., S.D., 444 F.2d 651, at 654 (6th Cir. 1971).
3. The government asserted that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, authorizes the use of electronic surveil-
lance for classes of crimes carefully specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2516. Such surveil-
lance is subject to prior court order as set out in 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
However, there is the following proviso upon which the government rests its con-
tention that a warrant is not needed in this case. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) states:
"Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign
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The District Court held that the surveillance violated the fourth amend-
ment, and ordered the government to make full disclosure to Plamondon of
his overheard conversations. 4
The government then filed an appeal in Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit asserting that Title III of the Ominbus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 gave the President the power to order warrantless
wiretaps. This court held that the surveillances were unlawful and that the
district court had properly required disclosure of the overheard conversa-
tions.5 The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed per curiam the
judgment of the court of appeals stating that the fourth amendment requires
prior judicial approval for this type of domestic security surveillance.
United States v. United States District Court For the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, et al., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
The significance of this decision lies in the fact that the United States
Supreme Court has finally decided, the heretofore unanswered question of
whether the surveillance of "domestic subversives" is an exception to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement. This question had been left
unanswered by Katz v. United States where the Supreme Court expressly
refused to deal with this problem. 6 However, in the United States District
Court decision, the Supreme Court in balancing the government's duty to
safeguard domestic security against the potential danger that unreasonable
surveillances pose to individual privacy and free expression, resolved the
matter in favor of the view that the freedoms of the fourth amendment
cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances are
conducted solely within the discretion of the executive branch, without the
detached judgment of a neutral magistrate. Therefore, the Court refused
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or
to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor
shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the Constitutional power
of the President to take-such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United
States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means,
or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Gov-
ernment. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority
of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence
in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable,
and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement
that power." (Emphasis added.)
4. United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074 (1971).
5. United States v. United States District Court, E.D. of Mich., S.D., 444 F.2d
651 (6th Cir. 1971)..
6. 389 U.S. 347, at 358 n.23 (1967). In this case the separate concurring
opinions of Justices Douglas and White gave rise to the controversy of the pro-
posed exception to the fourth amendment which the United States District Court
case rejected. See infra note 24.
19721
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
to expand the powers of the President of the United States beyond those
granted him by the Constitution. The purpose of this note is to examine
the history of the search warrant provision of the fourth amendment in
relation to electronic eavesdropping, its significance in reference to certain
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant, and the amendment's relation
to Presidential power granted by the Constitution and the Congress.
In the first fourth amendment decision on wiretapping, the United
States Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928) that the fourth amendment did not forbid wiretapping without a
warrant because there was no entry into the houses of the defendants and
therefore: (1) without an invasion of property rights there could be no
"search," and, (2) "conversations" or "words" did not involve anything
which could be "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment-
only "material things" could be seized.7 Chief Justice Taft delivering the
opinion of the Court in Olmstead noted that "Congress may of course
protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when inter-
cepted, inadmissible in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and
thus depart from the common law of evidence."" Congress followed this
suggestion with the passage of the Federal Communications Act of 1934
which forbade all wiretapping.9
The wording of section 605 of that Act was held to cover wiretapping
by state or federal officers as well as by private citizens when the Supreme
Court found in Nardone v. United States that "the plain words of §605 for-
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Justice Brandeis in his often quoted vigorous dissent
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) stated: "The protection
guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happi-
ness. . . . They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things. . . . They conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." (Id. at 478.)
"As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping." (Id. at
476.)
8. 277 U.S. at 465-66 (1928).
9. Prior to its supersession by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520), section 605 provided in part: '[N]o
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person; . . . no person having received
such intercepted communication . . . shall divulge or publish the existence . . .or
any part thereof, or use the same or any information therein contained for his
own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto...." Act of June
19, 1934, ch. 652 § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, as amended, 47 U,SC. § 605 (1970).
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bid anyone. . . to intercept a telephone message (unless authorized by the
sender). '"1° Therefore, the Court prohibited the use in federal courts of
wiretap evidence which had been obtained by federal 'agents. In later
decisions the Court prohibited the use in federal courts of wiretap evidence
obtained by state law enforcement officers, 1 and the use in state courts of
wiretap evidence which had been obtained by state law enforcement of-
ficers.' 2 Section 605 was also held to apply to intrastate as well as inter-
state communications. 13
Although section 605 created a complete prohibition on the use of
wiretap evidence in any state or federal prosecution prior to the passage of
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, this
10. 302 U.S. 379, at 382 (1937). In the second Nardone case, 308 U.S. 338
(1939), the Supreme Court developed the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in
relation to wiretaps. Any evidence, directly or indirectly, obtained through the use
of an illegal wiretap, was inadmissible. The burden being on the prosecution (once
the accused proves that wiretapping was unlawfully employed) to show that a causal
connection did not exist between the illicit wiretapping and the government's proof.
All evidence presented by the government must be obtained from an "independent
source" and be free from the "taint" of an illegal wiretap.
11. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957). In Benanti there was no
evidence of collusion between federal and state authorities but the Court held it
violated section 605, and was thus inadmissable.
12. Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968). It was not until two days before the
electronic surveillance provisions of the Crime Control Act of 1968 (supra note 3)
became law that the Supreme Court in this case overruled its previous holding in
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), and excluded state gathered wiretap evi-
dence in state criminal prosecutions.
In its Schwartz decision the Supreme Court had relied on Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949). In view of the extension of the exclusionary rule's application to
the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which overruled Wolf v. Colorado,
the foundation for Schwartz, namely Wolf, had clearly been already eroded, see 392
U.S. at 385.
The Lee Court also based its decision on the fact that: "Research has failed to
uncover a single reported prosecution of a law enforcement officer for violation
of § 605 since the statute was enacted. . . . We concluded .. . that nothing short
of mandatory exclusion of the illegal evidence will compel respect for the federal
law 'in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard.'"
Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. at 386-87 (1968).
13. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). However, the Department of
Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation viewed section 605 as not prohibit-
ing wiretapping alone, but only wiretapping followed by "divulgence", and further,
that it was not "divulgence" when one member of the government communicated
to another, but only when he communicated outside the government (i.e., sought to
introduce the wiretap information into evidence). See e.g., Brownell, The Public
Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197-200 (1954); Rogers, The
Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 793 (1954). For criticisrh of this view
see MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 144-45 (1959); Donnelly, Comments
and Caveats on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 YALE L.J. 799, 801 (1954);
E.B. Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's
View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 855, 860 (1960).
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was not true for all electronic "eavesdropping evidence" (i.e. those not at-
tained by a physical trespass). 1  In addition to the non-trespassing "elec-
tronic bugging" exception, section 605's prohibition against the use of wire-
tapping by police officers was eroded by later Supreme Court decisions.'1
The Court avoided the restricting language of section 605 by using the pre-
tenses of: (I) assumption of risk (consent of one of the parties), 16 or, (2)
no physical penetration being present, therefore, no trespass occurred. 17
14. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), section 605 was con-
strued to apply only to telephonic and telegraphic communications but not to all
electronic surveillance. Evidence obtained through wiretapping is distinguished from
that obtained by all other electronic surveillance methods. Wiretapping generally
inolves an actual physical entry into telephone or telegraphic circuits, while elec-
tron'c "bugs" can be used without such entry. Wiretapping was prohibited by
section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, but the Act did not apply to eaves-
dropping in general. Electronic sur\eillance ("bugging") was (prior to Title III
of the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968) limited only by the fourth
amendment, and, prior to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the amend-
ment was not deemed violated unless the "bugging" involved a phys'cal trespass
into a constitutionally protected area.
15. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928), the Supreme Court
had held the exclusionary rule applied only to violations of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court returned to this concept in Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S.
114 (1942), to avoid the effect of section 605 and the Nardone cases (see LAN-
DYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL INTERPRETATION, 211 (1966) (hereinafter referred to as Landynski). As a
result of Goldstein, one not a party to the tapped conversation had no standing to
object to the use of such evidence against him because his "personal" rights were
not violated.
16. The Supreme Court in Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957), held
that wiretapping was not prohibited by section 605 when done with the consent of
one of the parties to the conversation. In Rathbun the police listened in on an
e, tension with the victim's consent; the Court held that each party to a telephone
conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone
and may allow another to overhear the conversation. Other cases where similar
practices were upheld are: Carries v. United States, 295 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 861 (1962); Wilson v. United States, 316 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964).
For cases where the assumption of risk theory has been applied to electronic
eavesdropping not covered by section 605 see On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747, 753-54 (1952); Lopez v. United States, 375 U.S. 427 (1963); Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); see also
Note, Electronic Surveillance And The Supreme Court: A Move Back?, 21 DEPAUL
L. REV. 806 (1972).
17. This pretense was first noted in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942), the first modern eavesdropping case before the Supreme Court. In Gold-
man federal agents had placed a dictaphone against the wall of an adjoining office.
The Court stated that it was not a wire interception within the meaning of section 605
and was thus permissible. However, the Supreme Court held in Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), that where a physical penetration does occur it is viola-
tive of the fourth amendment.
[Vol. XXII
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When section 605 was eventually superseded by Title III in 1968,18 the
general ban on wiretapping was removed, and the constitutional standards
for all electronic surveillance became applicable to wiretapping as well.19
These standards were set forth in Berger v. New York 20 and Katz v. United
States.21 In Berger the Court related the standards for an eavesdropping
warrant by pointing out what constitutional defects were present in a state
statute permitting eavesdropping. The Court held in that case that
"'conversation' was within the Fourth Amendment's protections, and that
the use of electronic devices to capture it was a 'search' within the meaning
of the Amendment. '22 Katz determined when such warrants are necessary,
holding that a warrantless search is illegal when the party against whom the
eavesdropping is directed justifiably expects that his conversations are not
being overheard. 23  However, the Katz Court refused to deal with
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). Although the statute generally bans
interception and use of wire or oral communications, (18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)
(1970)), eavesdropping (including wiretapping) is authorized in the investigation of
certain enumerated crimes, provided application for such eavesdropping is made by
the Attorney General or his designate to a federal judge and is approved by the
same in accordance with section 2518.
19. The Senate Report on Title III indicates that the statute's standards are "in-
tended to reflect existing law" and makes specific reference to Katz, S. Rep. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2113 (1968). See notes 20 and 21 infra for a discussion
of existing law.
20. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Berger the Court held a New York statute which
established a warrant procedure for eavesdropping was too broad and sweeping and
thus violative of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. The statute was found
defective for six reasons: (1) it did not require probable cause that a particular
offense had been or was being committed; (2) it did not require particular descrip-
tion of the conversations sought; (3) its authorization of eavesdropping for a two-
month period with extensions was deemed too broad an authorization; (4) it placed
no termination date on the eavesdrop once the conversation sought had been ob-
tained; (5) there was neither a notice requirement nor a requirement of exigent cir-
cumstances in the absence of the former; and (6) it did not require a return on the
warrant. Id. at 58-60.
21. 389 U.S. 347. Katz set forth a standard for determining when a search
warrant is required for eavesdropping. In Katz the Supreme Court concluded that
Olmstead had been so eroded by subsequent decisions that the trespass doctrine
could no longer determine the applicability of the fourth amendment. The evidence
of petitioner's end of the conversation, overheard by F.B.I. agents who had attached
an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone booth
from which the calls were made, was deemed inadmissible. The Court held that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places" (389 U.S. at 351) thus striking
down the trespass theory that had arisen from Olmstead. The Supreme Court in
Katz unmistakably reaffirmed the traditional interpretation of the fourth amend-
ment. The Court declared that searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without the prior approval of a judge or magistrate, were "per se unreasonable"
under the fourth amendment. 389 U.S. at 357, n.18.
22. 388 U.S. at 51.
23. 389 U.S. at 347.
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"national security" eavesdropping, and from this refusal came litigation in
many district courts, and ultimately culminated with the decision of the
Supreme Court in the United States District Court case. 24
Subsequent to the Berger and Katz decisions, the Supreme Court in
Alderman v. United States25 held that where an electronic surveillance is
found to have been unlawful, and if a petitioner is found to have standing,
the government must disclose to him the records of those overheard
conversations which the government was not entitled to use in building its
case against him.26  In United States v. United States District Court the
defendant Plamondon moved to compel the government to give full disclo-
24. While the opinion of the Court in Katz specifically refused to answer whether
a warrant would be needed in a situation involving the "national security" the con-
curring opinion of Justice White stated: "We should not require the warrant pro-
cedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the United States or his
chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national
security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable." 389 U.S. 347, 364
(1967).
The case law concerning the constitutionality of the Attorney General's warrant-
less eavesdropping for "national security" had been split in the federal district courts
prior to this Supreme Court decision. In United States v. Dellinger (Criminal No.
CR-180 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1970)), the district judge ruled that the surveillance of
the defendant's conversations, though warrantless, did not in fact infringe upon their
constitutional rights. Similarly, in the case of United States v. O'Neal (Criminal
No. CR-1204 (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 1970) (in-court ruling)), the district judge made
an in-court ruling that surveillance pursuant to the authorization of the Attorney
General was lawful. See also Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leave of the
Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969); Comment,
Privacy and Political Freedom: Application o1 the Fourth Amendment to "National
Security" Investigations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1205 (1970).
In two other cases the Attorney General's actions were judged to be unconstitu-
tional. It was held in United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Calif. 1971),
that the warrantless wiretapping surveillance of a defendant accused of possession of
firearms was not constitutionally sanctioned even though the Attorney General had
expressly authorized it in the interest of national security. In United States v.
Hilliard, 39 U.S.L.W. 2679 (C.D. Calif. June 1, 1971) (opinion exists only in the
form of a transcript of the oral ruling from the bench), the court ruled that the
President has no constitutional exemption from the fourth amendment for wiretap-
ping in purely domestic matters.
25. This case along with Ivanov v. United States and Butenko v. United States
were joined by the Court in one opinion and are cited as 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
26. However, the Court limited this by holding that the suppression of the
product of a fourth amendment ivolation can be successfully urged only by those
whose rights were violated by the search itself, and not those who are aggrieved
solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Thus, co-defendants and co-con-
spirators have no special standing and cannot prevent the admission against them
of information which has been obtained through electronic surveillance which is
illegal against another. See 394 U.S. at 175-76, n.9 for a discussion of the term
"aggrieved person" in relation to standing. See also S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2112 (1968) for its legislative history in the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.
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sure of "illegally obtained" electronic surveillance information in accordance
with Alderman. The government answered by stating that section 2511(3)
of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 27 specifically
gave the President the power to electronically eavesdrop without a warrant
and therefore the surveillance was not "unlawful" and thus Alderman did
not apply. The Supreme Court rejected the government's answer and held
that section 2511(3) was not a grant of powers to the President but was
in fact neutral as to the granting or rescinding of presidential power. 28
The Court in deciding this case noted that: "Much of Title III was drawn
to meet the constitutional requirements for electronic surveillance enunci-
ated by this Court in Berger v. New York. . . and Katz v. United
States .... ",29 On the other hand the Court found that while the rest of
Title III is "elaborate" in its requirements and powers, section 2511(3):
certainly confers no power, as the language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose.
It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted to limit or disturb such power
as the President may have under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left
presidential powers where it found them.80
Therefore, the Attorney General must follow the procedures outlined in
18 U.S.C. 2518(1) in order to place an electronic surveillance upon
"domestic subversives," (i.e., he must follow the same procedure that is
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). This section purports to grant a national
security exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. The sec-
tion provides, inter alia, that nothing in Title III or in section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the President in dealing with threats from
foreign powers, in obtaining foreign intelligence information, or in protecting the
nation from "any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of
the Government." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970).
The bills to revise section 605 introduced prior to 1959 are listed in Hearings Be-
fore the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 781-1031 (1959). For those subsequent to
1959 see, Brief for Respondent at 57-58, United States v. United States District Court,
E.D. of Mich., S.D., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief).
28. United States v. United States District Court, E.D. of Mich., S.D., 407 U.S.
297 (1972).
29. Id. at 302.
30. Id. at 303. The Court explained this by reasoning that: "This view is
reinforced by the general context of Title III. Section 2511(1) broadly prohibits
the use of electronic surveillance '[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this
chapter.' Subsection (2) thereof contains four specific exceptions. In each of the
specified exceptions the statutory language is as follows: 'It shall not be unlaw-
ful .. . to intercept the particular type of communication described. . . .' The
language of subsection (3), here involved, is to be contrasted with the language of
the exceptions set forth in the preceding subsection. Rather than stating that war-
rantless presidential uses of electronic surveillance 'shall not be unlawful' and thus
employing the standard language of exception, subsection (3) merely disclaims any
intention to 'limit the constitutional power of the President.'" Id. at 303-04.
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required in order to obtain electronic surveillance in a criminal case).31
Justice Powell delivering the opinion of the Court noted that Congress
may wish to make a distinction in the future between Title III criminal
surveillances and those involving the domestic security.32 However, he also
noted that the legislative history of section 2511(3) showed that the
Congress had not yet adopted such a differentiation and that this section
could not be seen as more than "a congressional disclaimer and expression
of neutrality," rather than an exception to section 2518 .
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, stated that the lower courts
had enunciated beyond the question before them and that he would not go
into the constitutional merits or the neutrality of section 2511(3), but
rather he would affirm the lower court decision because "the surveillance
undertaken by the government in this case was illegal under the statute
itself. . . ,,14 He noted that the affidavit of the Attorney General asserted
that the monitoring was employed to gather information "deemed necessary
to protect the Nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and
subvert the existing structure of the Government. ' 35 Justice White stated
that this affidavit did not meet the criteria of section 2511(3); the sur-
veillance was not undertaken to protect against foreign attack nor was the
surveillance necessary to prevent a clear and present danger to the existence
or structure of the government as to its overthrow by force or other unlaw-
ful means. The reason for the warrantless surveillance was therefore not
within the exceptions of the section. The affidavit spoke only of attempts
to attack or subvert and Justice White noted that "[t]he shortcomings of
the affidavit when measured against §2511 (3) are patent."30
In finding that section 2511(3) was neutral as to its authority for war-
rantless surveillance the Court held that the statute was not the measure of
31. For the legislative purpose and history of this section see 1968 U.S. Code
Cong. and Adm. News, at 2112.
32. United States v. United States District Court, E.D. of Mich., S.D., 407 U.S.
297, 322 (1972). He noted further that the Congress may change the requirements as
to section 2518 so that they would be "more appropriate to domestic security cases"
and that: "the request for prior court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be
made to any member of a specifically designated court (e.g., the District Court or
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); and that the time-and-reporting
requirements need not be so strict as those in §2518." Id. at 323.
33. 407 U.S. 297, at 308 (1972). The Supreme Court found a colloquy be-
tween Senators Hart, Holland, and McClellan on the Senate floor to be the true
indication of the legislative intent of neutrality in section 2511(3) (see Id. at
306-07).
34. 407 U.S. 297, 340.
35. Id. at 341.
36. Id. at 341.
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the executive authority asserted in this case.37 Rather, the Court turned
to an inspection of the constitutional powers of the President for the al-
leged authority for the action. The Government asserted that the President
has a duty to protect the national security and that he has authority to
gather intelligence information necessary to perform that function. 38  To
support its proposition that the President had such an implied power the
government cited previous Supreme Court decisions,39 however, these cases
dealt with the war and foreign relations powers of the President and not
with the power of the judiciary where the executive acts in domestic af-
fairs. 40  Moveover, the fact that the Constitution (specifically the bill of
rights) limits the President even in his most awesome responsibilities in
"domestic affairs" is well established. 41
The Supreme Court in United States v. United States District Court noted
that under Article II, § 1, of the Constitution, the President has the funda-
mental duty "to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States."'42 The Court did not find that his duty was to protect the existing
structure of government, but that his primary duty is to protect the Consti-
tution, and as such the Court found that the President's "domestic security
role. . . must be exercised in a manner compatible with the fourth amend-
ment. In this case we hold that this requires an appropriate prior warrant
procedure. '43 The government argued that the exercise of this power by
the President has continued for thirty years and that this itself supports its
37. Id. at 308.
38. The government claims that implicit in his duty as chief executive the Presi-
dent has a duty to protect the existing system of government against overthrow by
unlawful means and assuring that the government can function effectively. To ful-
fill this responsibility, the President claims that he must be able to exercise an in-
formed judgment and to do so he must be allowed to gather information by
electronic surveillance. Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, United States v. United States
District Court, E.D. of Mich., S.D., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Govt.
Brief).
39. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886(1961); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103(1948); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297(1918); and Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). As accurately noted by
the court of appeals, none of these cases were criminal cases, and none dealt with
a domestic security problem. 444 F.2d at 659.
40. In relation to war powers see generally Gilmore, War Powers-Executive
Power and the Constitution, 29 IowA L. REV. 463 (1944); White, The War Powers
of the President, 1943 Wis. L. REV. 205 (1943).
41. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
42. 407 U.S. at 310.
43. Id. at 320.
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existence and validity.44 The Court noted this argument but was not
dissuaded from its finding that the fourth amendment restricts the inherent
powers of the President.45
Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion noted that "'warrantless de-
vices accounted for an average of 78 to 209 days of listening per device, as
compared. with a 13-day per device average for those devices installed
under court order.' ",46 This vast difference shows a need for the control
of executive ordered electronic surveillance. As the Supreme Court noted
in the instant case:
History abundantly documents the tendency of Government-however benevolent and
benign its motives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its poli-
cies. Fourth amendment protections become the more necessary when the targets of
official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs.
The danger to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under
so vague a concept as the power to protect 'domestic security.' Given the difficulty of
44. Govt. Brief at 18.
45. 407 U.S. at 310-14. In his decision Justice Powell stated that: "the use of
such surveillance in internal security cases has been sanctioned more or less con-
tinuously by various Presidents and Attorneys' General since July 1946." The judge
elaborated on this point in a footnote on the history of this procedure (see id. at
310-11, n.10). See also Govt. Brief at 16-18; Respondent's Brief at 51-56; Cong.
Rec. 117, 6476-77, (1971); Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39
CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1954); Rogers, The Case For Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792
(1954); see generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, at 363 (1967).
The history of the prior use of warrantless wiretaps by Attorneys General in
itself in fact undercuts the government's argument. To justify so grave a business
as warrantless eavesdropping, a prior practice would have to convey unambiguously
that the specific authority sought would, if granted, continue an accepted activity.
Prior practice was patently ambiguous in this respect, because it included periods
during which the specific authority here claimed would have been disallowed (under
Roosevelt and probably during the latter years of the Johnson Administration),
as well as periods during which even broader authority was provided (under Truman,
Kennedy and the early Johnson years). The fact that authority for wiretaps in do-
mestic criminal cases (totally unrelated to "national security" existed during a
substantial part of the period involved shows that the practice was lawless in itself,
and not based on a restrictive national security theory as the government claimed in
this case. E.g., Kolod v. United States, 390 U.S. 136 (1968) (interstate threat):
Granello v. United States, 386 U.S. 1019 (1967) (tax); O'Brien v. United States, 386
U.S. 345 (1967) (customs); Schipani v. United States, 385 U.S. 372 (1966) (tax);
Black v. United States, supra (tax); United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 372 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1967) (gambling); United States v. Baker,
262 F. Supp. 657 (D.C.D.C. 1966) (larceny and tax). See generally Respondent's
Brief at 53-55; Theoharis & Meyer, The "National Security" Justification For Elec-
tronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 749, at 760-63
(1968).
46. 407 U.S. at 325-26, n.3. It should be noted that wiretaps are a very costly
item-the average cost of each federal court-approved wiretap during 1970 was
$12,106 (Admin. Office U.S. Courts, Report on Applications for Orders Authoriz-
ing or Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral Communications at 17 (April
1971)).
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defining the domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that
interest becomes apparent. 4 7 (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, when lengthy surveillances are conducted, unchecked by anyone
but those doing the surveillance, and unknown to those being watched, the
likelihood of abuse is too prevalent to allow it to go unchecked.
The remedy given by the Court to protect against this abuse is of much
importance. The Court did not seek to determine whether it could or
should enjoin or otherwise affirmatively prohibit any search that the Presi-
dent or his chief law enforcement officer decides must be carried out.
Rather, it merely ordered that the fruits of the surveillances must be dis-
closed to the defendant and that any unlawful surveillances or their "fruits"
would be inadmissible. 48  The fourth amendment does not prohibit the
President or other officials from defending the existence of the state, it
merely prescribes what methods must be followed.
The government's assertion that the President needs the power to wiretap
without a warrant to gather intelligence information to protect society was
not in fact the interest at stake in this case. The Supreme Court in Camara
v. Municipal Court49 was confronted with an argument identical in principle
to that raised by the government in the instant case:
that the health and safety of entire urban populations is dependent upon enforcement
of minimum fire, housing, and sanitation standards, and that the only effective means
of enforcing such codes is by routine systematized inspection of all physical
structures. 5 0
As the Court noted in that case, "this argument misses the mark. The
question is not . . .whether these inspections may be made, but whether
they may be made without a warrant." 51 The Supreme Court has merely
held that the President is governed by the Constitution and must comply
with its amendments. The fact that this requirement is not overly restric-
tive upon the Executive's duty to protect the government is exemplified by
the fact that in the two-year period of 1969 and 1970 only one application
to a federal judge was denied in relation to electronic surveillance. 52
47. 407 U.S. at 314.
48. Id. at 324.
49. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
50. Id. at 533.
51. The Supreme Court in its present decision noted that it did not think that
the ". . . Government's domestic surveillance powers will be impaired to any sig-
nificant degree. A prior warrant establishes presumptive validity of the surveillance
and will minimize the burden of justification in post-surveillance judicial review."
407 U.S. at 321.
52. See Admin. Office U.S. Courts, Report on Applications for Orders Authoriz-
ing or Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral Communications at 5 (April 1971 ),
and id. at 4 (April 1970). This may also indicate that judges may merely become
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In a final effort to justify the inordinate power it sought, the government
assumed that the Attorney General could order warrantless electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes and then use the information
obtained as evidence. It then argued that "no sharp and clear distinction
can be drawn between 'foreign' and 'domestic' information," and that any
effort to "compartmentalize national security into rigid separate segments
of 'foreign' and 'domestic' ignores the realities. . . ."" The Court
rejected this argument noting that Congress has been able to distinguish
the two;5 4 and that although the Court would attempt no precise definition,
Justice Powell stated:
we use the term 'domestic organization' in this opinion to mean a group or organiza-
tion (whether formally or informally constituted) composed of citizens of the
"rubber stamps" of the Attorney General after the enforcement of United States
District Court. It may be necessary for Congress to select only certain judges in
a district to forestall government officials from picking a sympathetic judge. By
this method the meaning of this decision will be enforced and expertise cultivated
among the participating judiciary.
53. Govt. Brief at 34.
54. 407 U.S. 297 at 309, n.8 (1972) states in part: "Section 2511(3) refers to
'the constitutional power of the President' in two types of situations: (i) where
necessary to protect against attack, other hostile acts or intelligence activities of a
'foreign power'; or (ii) where necessary to protect against the overthrow of the
Government or other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the
Government. Although both of the specified situations are sometimes referred to
as 'national security' threats, the term 'national security' is used only in the first
sentence of § 2511(3) with respect to the activities of foreign powers. This case
involves only the second sentence of § 2511(3), with the threat emanating-accord-
ing to the Attorney General's affidavit-from 'domestic organizations.'"
Particularly pertinent in this context is the American Bar Association's adoption
of the very distinction that the government in this case claimed could not be made;
"The use of electronic surveillance techniques by appropriate federal officers for
the overhearing or recording of wire or oral communications to protect the nation
from attack by or other hostile acts of a foreign power or to protect military or
other national security information against foreign intelligence activities should be
permitted subject to appropriate Presidential and Congressional standards and su-
pervision." (Emphasis added.) (Part 3.1 of ABA Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance, at 4, 120-21 (1971)).
Mr. Lewis F. Powell, then a member of the Special Committee to consider amend-
ments, explained the distinction during the floor debates: "I call the House's at-
tention to the fact that 3.01 and 3.02, which relate to national security, provide
for a national security exception to the court order and warrant procedure which is
the bedrock provision of the standards with respect to ordinary cases.
"It is essentially (sic) in this debate .. . to understand that this exception relates
only to cases where national security is threatened by foreign powers or activities.
The exception does not relate to domestic threats or subversion.
"This distinction is explicitly clear from the standard and from the commentaries.
The suggestion that domestic security may be involved is completely beside the point
of this discussion." Transcript of Record, Minutes of House of Delegates, at 71
(Feb. 9, 1971). (Emphasis added.)
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United States and which has no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents
or agencies. 5 5 (Emphasis added.)
The differentiation of "national security" and "domestic organiza-
tions" is necessary to understand the Court's ruling in this case. However,
in relation to the former it should be noted that classifying surveillance as
such is not enough to evade the Constitutional protections of the fourth
amendment. As the Supreme Court stressed in United States v. Robel, the
"talismanic incantation" of the phrase "national defense" cannot be used
to override those rights and values which the national defense is supposed
to safeguard. 56
In its present decision the Court noted that "the Fourth Amendment is
not absolute" and therefore the Court's task is to balance "the duty of
Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger
posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free ex-
pression."517 The Court concluded that free expression would be better
protected by requiring that a warrant be a prerequisite before such
surveillance is undertaken, and that this warrant requirement would not
unduly frustrate the efforts of government to protect itself from acts of
subversion and overthrow directed against it.58 The government asserted
that the surveillance involved in this case was merely a slight invasion of
privacy and thus "reasonable" because the defendant's conversation was
overheard, not on his own phone, but on the phone of another party under
55. 407 U.S. 297, at 309, n.8 (1972). In the majority opinion Justice Powell
further noted that: "No doubt there are cases where it will be difficult to distin-
guish between 'domestic' and 'foreign' unlawful activities directed against the Gov-
ernment of the United States where there is collaboration in varying degrees between
domestic groups or organizations and agents or agencies of foreign powers. But
this is not such a case." Id.
The government itself only recently contended that a distinction could be made
between its eavesdropping activities aimed at foreign powers and those aimed at
uncovering domestic threats. In its petition for rehearing in Ivanov v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (filed March 1969), the government requested that the Supreme
Court reconsider that portion of its decision "which relates to the disclosure to de-
fendants of the results of electronic surveillance relating to the gathering of foreign
intelligence information ...... (Id. at 165). There, the government was asking the
Court to make the distinction it claimed the Supreme Court was incapable of formu-
lating in the instant case. In Ivanov the government stated: "In presenting this
petition, we do not use the term 'national security.' We recognize that that phrase
can be given a broad meaning covering such matters as organized crime and internal
security. Our submission here is limited to a narrow category of the gathering of
foreign intelligence information, i.e., matters affecting the external security of the
country .. " (Id. at 165). See generally Justice Fortas' definition of "national
security material" in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, at 209 (1969).
56. 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967).
57. 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972).
58. Id. at 315.
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surveillance. 59 The Court rejected this noting that "reasonableness" as
intended by the fourth amendment is governed by the warrant clause; 60
the Court had previously stated in Camara that for a search (without
proper consent) to be reasonable it must, except in certain circumstances, 61
be authorized by a valid search warrant.6 2
It has been stated frequently by the Supreme Court that the "burden is
on those seeking (an) exemption (from the requirement) to show the
59. Govt. Brief at 13. In explaining how the government came to overhear
the defendant, the government stated: "The defendant, Plamondon, was not the
subject of the surveillance in question. . . . As shown in the sealed exhibit filed
in the district court, the surveillance was directed to a wholly independent organiza-
tion, of which Plamondon was not a member, on the basis of information available
to the Attorney General from other intelligence operations. Plamondon was over-
heard during conversations with this organization ...
"We think these records demonstrate that any characterization of the organization
in question as 'domestic' is unsupportable. For example, over a fourteen month pe-
riod, 521 telephone calls were made from this installation to foreign and overseas in-
stallations and another 431 calls, the contents of which deal with foreign subject mat-
ter, were placed to domestic installations." (Govt. Brief at 30-31, note 13). The "for-
eign security" aspect of the wiretap was never brought up in the lower courts and
the Supreme Court did not recognize the issue. For a discussion of foreign security
surveillance, see note 77 infra.
What makes this disclosure really significant is the fact that this wiretap intruded
on all conversations occurring on the phone without regard to whether they were
even remotely connected with national security. There was no limit set on either
the times during which eavesdropping could be undertaken, or the duration of the
wiretap. In fact the wiretap in this case lasted at least fourteen continuous months
and intruded upon 952 outgoing calls. It is apparent that the search struck down
by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) was far less
offensive than this wiretap, since the statute involved in Berger at least required that
the persons to be surveilled be named, and that application for authority be renewed
after a maximum of two months. Here, no limits existed.
60. 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972). The test put forth by the government and
stated in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) was: "[T]he relevant
test is not whether it was reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search was reasonable." The Court in the instant case rejected this test stating that
"[T]his view, however, overlooks the second clause of the Amendment. The war-
rant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not dead language." (407 U.S. at 315).
The Court further noted (relying on Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969))
that, "[U]nder such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this
area would approach the evaporation point." The government's assertion that "the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures without a warrant,
but only unreasonable ones" (Govt. Brief at 5), is a mere play on words. This
argument implies that "reasonable" searches, without a warrant and without more,
are perfectly proper and thus that warrants are required only for "unreasonable"
searches; which is the same as saying that warrants simply are not required, since
"unreasonable" searches are unlawful under the fourth amendment, with or without
a warrant.
61. Inlra note 65.
62. 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
need for it. . .. ,,63 The Government failed to bear this burden and the
Court reaffirmed the principle that: "the 'police must, whenever practica-
ble, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure .... ,64 The Government did not claim that the
search undertaken in this case was justified under any existing exception to
the warrant requirement. Nor did it reason by analogy that the rationale
behind the existing exceptions would support a proposed "national security"-
exception (i.e., that the warrant procedure would frustrate the purpose of
an otherwise lawful search). 65
The history of the reasons for, and the formulation of, the fourth amend-
ment clearly shows that it was intended to forbid the action which the gov-
ernment attempted to justify in this case.66 The Court in United States
District Court reviewed this history and found that:
63. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970).
64. 407 U.S. at 318 (1972).
65. The exceptions delineated by the Supreme Court are in regard to situations
where it would not be feasible to procure a warrant in the time allowed. Searches
incident to arrests, stop-and-frisks, searches of vehicles, and hot-pursuit situations
are exceptions to the warrant requirement because of the practical needs of law
enforcement officers to: (1) protect their physical well being, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 23 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); (2) to pre-
vent suspects from using hidden weapons to escape from custody, Chimel v. Cali-
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); (3) to preserve evidence from destruction or
removal beyond the officer's reach, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770
(1966); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967); Carrol v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164 (1949); Cooper
v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 60 (1967); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51
(1970); (4) or to respond to an emergency, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451,455 (1948).
However, it should be noted that these warrantless searches are justified, not
solely on the need to search, but more specifically, on the need to search without
a warrant. They are exceptions, not alternatives to the warrant requirement. To be
lawful, moreover, even these searches must be based on probable cause.
The 1968 Omnibus Crime Act also provides that the Attorney General is em-
powered to apply to a court for an order to wiretap, or in emergencies unilaterally
to authorize wiretaps, subject to subsequent judicial approval, in connection with
several crimes, including espionage, sabotage, treason and riots. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516
(I) (a) and 2518 (7). The constitutionality of these provisions has not yet been deter-
mined by the Supreme Court (in the instant case the government did not rely upon
these sections).
66. The history of the struggle which ultimately led to the fourth amendment
has been fully chronicled by the Supreme Court in previous decisions. See Marcus
v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
363-66, 376-77 (dissenting opinion); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625
(1886); Sanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1965); see also, Landynski, supra
note 15; Comment, Privacy and -Political Freedom: Application of the Fourth
Amendment to "National Security" Investigations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1205, 1212-16
(1970).
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The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating
evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech ...
The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, ... not the risk
that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. 6 7
The Court noted that it used the word "judicial" to "connote the traditional
fourth amendment requirement of a neutral and detached magistrate. '6 8
In the present case the government also asserted that courts should not
substitute their judgment for that of the Attorney General on whether the
particular organization, person or event involved has a sufficient connection
to the protection of the national security to justify the surveillance.
Therefore, the government urged that the requirement of prior judicial
review is not necessary because the surveillances: (1) are not an attempt
to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions; 9 (2) their com-
plexity places them beyond the competence of courts to evaluate;70 and
(3) prior judicial review would threaten governmental secrecy, which is an
essential ingredient in intelligence gathering.7'1
67. 407 U.S. at 317.
68. 407 U.S. at 317, n.18.
69. Govt. Brief at 15-16, 19, 23-24. Govt. Reply Brief at 2-3.
The government argued that the protection derived from the showing of proof
normally required before searches are allowed is dispensable, since it is collecting
"information" which "normally" will not result in prosecutions. (See Govt. Brief
at 21). Under this view, the fourth amendment would protect those prosecuted,
but this is not what its framers intended. The Supreme Court had previously re-
jected a similar contention of the government in Camara, supra note 49, at 530-31:
"It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully
protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal behavior. For instance, even the most law-abiding citizen has a very
tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home
may be broken by official authority, while the possibility of criminal entry under
the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security."
70. Govt. Reply Brief at 4, Govt. Brief at 7. This seems to be an impossible
position to maintain given the complexity of matters upon which the federal courts
are called upon to rule daily. (E.g., Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956)). Also
the fact that the government concedes that there is a judicial role in reviewing the
legality of such searches after the fact, shows that the courts are able to make an
"informed judgment". See Govt. Brief at 21. The fact that the fourth amendment
makes no distinction between crimes is an indication that the magistrate's compe-
tence in assessing "probable cause" was not intended to depend upon the nature of
the crime involved. (See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971)).
71. Govt. Brief at 6-7, 24-25. The government was fearful that it would have
to disclose important intelligence information and its sources which could possibly
be leaked by a stenographer, bailiff or clerk. The Court did not find this a valid
argument noting that: "Whatever security dangers clerical and secretarial personnel
may pose can be minimized by proper administrative measures, possibly to the point
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Although the Court noted that these contentions "merit the most careful
consideration," the Court found that "the circumstances described do not
justify complete exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior
judicial scrutiny. '7 2 The Court noted that in relation to the first conten-
tion, "official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or
ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally pro-
tected privacy of speech. . . (and) this requires an appropriate prior
warrant procedure. '73
In reference to the second contention, the Court stated that it could not
accept this argument because of the complexity of problems competently
dealt with daily by judges. Also the Court noted that: "If the threat is
too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey
its significance to a court, one may question whether there is probable
cause for surveillance."' 74 Nor could the Court believe that prior judicial
approval would "fracture" the secrecy essential to official intelligence
gathering. The Court stated that:
The investigation of criminal activity has long involved imparting sensitive information
to judicial officers who have respected the confidentialities involved. Judges may
be counted upon to be especially conscious of security requirements in national
security cases. 75
of allowing the Government itself to provide the necessary clerical assistance." 407
U.S. 297, 321 (1972).
It should also be pointed out that the limited need for information in such a priorjudicial hearing, shows that the government's fear of a breach of secrecy is not
well founded. The government's argument suggests that all information relevant
to probable cause must be disclosed in a warrant proceeding. This is incorrect. A
warrant proceeding allows wide flexibility in the type of information that may be
presented or withheld. Strict evidentiary rules are inapplicable. Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. at 176. The government may rely on information received through
an informant, see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), even to the point
that a warrant may issue solely upon hearsay, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
271 (1960). And, significantly for present purposes, the informer's identity need
not be revealed, either before the search or subsequently on a motion to suppress.
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). Courts would, if anything, be even more
sensitive to the need for secrecy of sources in "national security" cases than in
ordinary criminal prosecutions. Therefore, whatever may be the merits of the gov-
ernment's claim that eavesdropping is a "proven effective method of gathering in-
telligence information .... " the dangers posed by requiring a warrant before evi-
dentiary use is permitted are modest at most, and may readily be obviated. And
when a warrant is obtained the government may invoke the rule of United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965), giving it the benefit of any doubt concerning the
search's legality.
72. 407 U.S. at 319-20 (1972).
73. 407 U.S. at 320.
74. 407 U.S. at 320.
75. 407 U.S. at 320-21. The Court further noted that Title II of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act already has "imposed this responsibility on thejudiciary in connection with such crimes as espionage, sabotage and treason, § 2516
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Therefore, the Court concluded that the government's concerns, "do not
justify departure. . . from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement
of judicial approval prior to initiation of a search or surveillance." 76
The meaning of this decision is shown by the emphasis that the Supreme
Court placed on what was not within the scope of its decision. The Court
noted that "this case involves only the domestic aspects of national
security. . ." and that the Court did not address itself to, and expressed
no opinion as to, "the issues which may be involved with respect to
activities of foreign powers or their agents."' 77 The Court also noted that
its decision does not "rest on the language of §2511 (3) or any other
section of Title III..."78 and it also stated that "we do not hold that the
same type of standards and procedures prescribed by Title III are neces-
sarily applicable in this case."' 79 This express statement of what its decision
did not mean was intended by the Court to avoid any confusion as to the
fact that it has only decided the domestic aspects of national security in
relation to the fourth amendment. The Court also refused to re-examine
(1) (a) and (C), each of which may involve domestic as well as foreign security
threats." id. at 320-21.
76. Id. at 321.
77. 407 U.S. at 322. The Court thus expressly refused to examine the constitu-
tional question presented previously in United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th
Cir. 1970), where the defendant was not allowed a copy of wiretaps, completed
without a warrant being obtained, in foreign intelligence surveillance.
For a view that such surveillance is constitutional, see United States v. Smith,
321 F. Supp. 424 (C.D. Calif. 1971); United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66
(D.N.J. 1970). However, the fact that the Constitution gives the conduct of
"foreign affairs" to the executive, should not force the overlooking of the fact that
the regulation of searches was specifically committed to the judicial department of
the government by the same constitution. Therefore, it may be submitted that the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of the search power is necessarily the
subject of judicial inquiry. See generally Comment, supra note 66, at 1239.
However, the failure of the Court to define "foreign powers or their agents" may
in effect make this decision meaningless. For the federal government may attempt
to classify warrantless electronic surveillance as involving foreign agents and thus
circumvent the meaning of this case. This will ultimately lead to further litigation
on this controversial definition. For the view that the mere "foreign" classification
would not be sufficient to exclude a surveillance from this decision see note 56 and
accompanying text supra.
78. 407 U.S. at 322. The constitutionality of many sections of Title III has
been questioned by many authors. In relation to the questionable constitutionality
of the requirement for a wiretap in section 2518 see, Note, Wiretapping and Elec-
tronic Surveillance-Title III Of The Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L.
REV. 319, at 386-87 (1969). As to the "dubious constitutionality" of section 2511(3)
see generally Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics
of "Law and Order," 67 MicH. L. REv. 455 (1969). Even President Richard M.
Nixon has criticized Title III because "in some respects it failed to define clearly the
acceptable limits of the practice." Civil Liberties, Oct. 1968, at 10, col. 2.
79. 407 U.S. at 322.
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the scope and basis of its Alderman decision, noting that it found "it
unnecessary at this time and on the facts of this case" to do so.80
The initial impact of this present decision was seen in Gelbard v. United
States and United v. Egan,"' which were decided together by the United
States Supreme Court on June 26, 1972 (one week after its United States
District Court decision). In these two cases the Supreme Court decided
that a showing by a witness before a grand jury that interrogation which he
refused to answer would be based upon an illegal interception of the
witness' communications constitutes "just cause" for refusing to comply
with an order of the court to testify before the grand jury and precludes a
finding of contempt for such refusal to testify.82 Moreover, within hours
of the United States District Court decision, Attorney General Richard G.
Kleindienst" 'directed the termination of all electronic surveillance in cases
involving domestic security that conflict with the court's (sic) opinion.' "83
The ultimate impact of United States District Court may well be in its
enforcement of the separation of powers doctrine. The refusal of the
80. 407 U.S. at 324, n.21. The government had asserted that Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) was not based on the Constitution, but rather,
on the Court's supervisory power (Govt. Brief at 35-37). Therefore, the Govern-
ment claimed that an act of Congress can and did supercede this power (Title III
of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Act) and therefore automatic disclosure cannot be
required. The government noted that the legislative history of Title VII of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C. § 3504) showed that it was
intended to supercede Alderman for surveillances prior to June 19, 1968 (Govt.
Brief 42-47) and that the 1968 Act was to govern post June 19, 1968 cases (as the
surveillance in this case was); see generally 116 Cong. Rec. H 9710-9711 (daily ed.
Oct. 7, 1970); 116 Cong. Rec. S. 17775 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1970).
However, it should be recognized that Alderman was decided after the 1968 Act
was passed by Congress. Also section 2518 (10)(a)(iii) of the 1968 Act provides
that, "[Ilf the motion (to suppress) is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire
or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having
been obtained in violation of this chapter." This provision is clearly a reference
back to section 2515, which provides that "no part of the contents of such (illegally
obtained) communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in
evidence in any trial. . . ." This provision may be seen as adopting a similar taint
rule as was enforced in Alderman.
81. 408 U.S. 41 (1972). This was a 5-4 decision of the Court; Mr. Justice
Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Chief Justice Burger joined.
However, this should be contrasted with Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) which
was decided the same day (June 26, 1972), in which Mr. Justice White joined with
the dissenters in Gelbard and the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to present a
justiciable controversy . . . by the mere existence and operation of the Army's intel-
ligence-gathering and distributing system, where (the) plaintiffs complained of no
specific action against them, and where evidence disclosed no unlawful surveillance
activities.
82. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
83. Chicago Daily News, June 20, 1972, at 4, col. 1.
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Court to grant the Executive the right to enter into the judicial function in
this aspect allows the courts to guard against further abuses. The "chilling
effect" that domestic eavesdropping may have on the first amendment
right to association 4 and the proposed "zones of privacy" in the first,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments should be devastating. For unchecked
eavesdropping without notice will inevitably harm memberships and
ultimately may make the public fearful of any dissenting speech. Moreover,
because of its secrecy one cannot avail himself of the regular judicial
remedies, and this protection would be usurped by the Executive, for
without knowledge one cannot seek an injunction, nor a suit for damages s
Furthermore, the fact that the Attorney General is accountable to the
President, and through him to the people, for authorizing surveillances is
a meaningless protection since the government clearly intends to keep
secret the extent, scope, and subjects of such intrusions. To the extent
that public approval is relevant, moreover, it is an entirely inappropriate
standard by which to define constiutional rights. In times of great internal
stress the majority may well favor curtailing the exercise of rights, but the
Bill of Rights was intended to protect the minority from the government
and not to be placed on the ballot every four years.
The refusal to give this power to the Executive prevents it from ulti-
mately being abused, for "power, once granted, does not disappear like
a magic gift when it is wrongfully used."8 It persists and becomes avail-
able for misuse and further exploitation, and each new administration, in
each new "national crisis." This possibility of abuse of the privacy of
homes and communications is precisely why the warrant requirement was
established in the fourth amendment over 181 years ago, in a time that
was itself enveloped in a true "national crisis."
Kevin I. Caplis
84. This right to association as a fundamental first amendment freedom was
recognized in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
85. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
86. Id. at 392.
